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Carbone: Carbone: Interference of the Court

The Interference of the Court of the
Seat with International Arbitration
Giulia Carbone*
I. INTRODUCTION
According to Blackaby and Partasides' definition,' "[t]he relationship between national courts and arbitral tribunals swings between forced cohabitation
and true partnership." By choosing to devolve their dispute to arbitration, parties
agree to forgo local remedies to participate in the proceedings administered by a
neutral and private means of justice, and to be bound by the award so rendered.
This choice relegates national courts to a secondary position, unless the parties or
the arbitral tribunal itself seek the assistance of local forums when they need to
remove juridical obstacles from the arbitration proceedings.
This does not mean that there is no room for interaction between local courts
and arbitration tribunals. Following Blackaby and Partasides, "national courts
could exist without arbitration, but arbitration could not exist without the courts.
The real issue is to define the point where this reliance of arbitration on national
courts begins and where it ends." 2 The support of the courts is an integral and
indispensable part of the arbitration mechanism, as no arbitration can achieve its
aims without the assistance of the domestic juridical system. This is so even in
cases where assistance is confined to the post-arbitration phase of the enforcement
of the award.3 Moreover, the involvement of the public judicial system guarantees
that a minimum standard of due process and fairness in the arbitration proceedings
is ensured.4
The role and the extent of the powers that courts may exercise relating to arbitration vary from country to country, depending mainly on the general approach
national legislation takes towards alternative dispute resolution mechanisms,
which can range from an open mistrust to full acknowledgment of their autonomy.
This article, however, will focus on national courts' pathological interference with
* LL.M. Cantab, J.D. Bocconi University, LL.B. Bocconi University, Associate at Boncili Erede
Pappalardo, Milan. This Article won first place in a student writing competition sponsored by the
North American Branch of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (ClArb) in conjunction with the "Border Skirmishes" symposium.
1. NIGEL BLACKABY, CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, REDFERN
AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 438 (5th cd. 2009).
2. Id. at 439.
3. It is emblematic that even a devote defender of arbitration's autonomy admits that "despite the
autonomous nature of arbitration, it must be recognized that just as no man or woman is an island, so
no system of dispute resolution can exist in a vacuum." Julian Lew, Does National Court Involvement
Undermine the InternationalArbitration Process?, 24 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 489, 492 (2009). William
W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding ProceduralIntegrity in International
Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 647, 650 (1989) ("[t]hc fashion for non-national justice and arbitral
autonomy, if pushed too far, will ultimate backfire and compromise the integrity of international dispute resolution").
4. MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 84 (2008).
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international arbitration, which occurs when courts exercise their powers to impede the effectiveness of the arbitration proceedings. The distinction between
simple involvement and interference does not seem to have a formal juridical
basis. Instead, it is an intangible and enormous discrimen of which practitioners
and scholars are fully aware. 5 There is a fine line between helpful assistance and
unhelpful hindrance6 and, as it was wisely noted, "[w]hether court intervention is
viewed as supporting or interfering with the arbitral process will depend upon a
range of factors including the timing, manner and degree of such intervention."7
In other words, the question that arises is "when does 'involvement' by a court
become 'intervention' in the arbitral process; and when does 'intervention' become 'interference' with a process which is supposed to stand on its own feet?" 8
However, this indefinable concept seems to have found textual recognition in
the 1985 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (hereinafter referred to as
"UNCITRAL Model Law"), which makes a distinction between "court intervention" and "court assistance and supervision," excluding the former unless otherwise provided by that Law. The Model Law Explanatory Notes justified the reduced role for local court intervention on international arbitration as follows:
Recent amendments to arbitration laws reveal a trend in favour of limiting and clearly defining court involvement in international commercial
arbitration. This is justified in view of the fact that the parties to an arbitration agreement make a conscious decision to exclude court jurisdiction
and prefer the finality and expediency of the arbitral process.... Protecting the arbitral process from unpredictable or disruptive court interference is essential to parties who choose arbitration (in particular foreign
parties). 9
Thus, the principle of parties' autonomy, on which arbitration is grounded,
requires that the role of judicial organs be restricted and that the assertion of
court's powers upon ongoing arbitration proceedings be limited to situations that
are statutorily permitted. As mentioned before, this paper will analyze the juridical and factual problems caused by the control and supervision exercised by the
courts of the seat of the arbitration over international arbitral proceedings. In
order to further define the scope of this research, the issue of interference, as
above defined, will be investigated with reference to international arbitration pro5. See Martin Hunter, Introduction:An Overview of the Relationship Between Courts and Investment Treaty Arbitration, in INVESTMENT TREATY LAW: CURRENT ISSUES VOLUME 155 (Federico
Ortino, Audley Sheppard & Hugo Warner eds., 2006). In another work, the author refers to the 'supportive' role of the courts, using the italics, as to distinguish this kind of role to a non-supportive
(interfering?) one: Martin Hunter, Judicial Assistance for the Arbitrator, in CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 195, 196 (Julian DM Lew ed., 1986).

6. MOSES, supranote 4, at 85.
7. John Lurie, Court Intervention in Arbitration: Support or Interference?, 76 ARB.: THE INT'L J.
OF ARB., MEDIATION & DISP. MGMT. 447 (2010).
8. BLACKABY ET AL., supranote 1, at 443.
9. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the 1985 Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration (as amended 2006) 27, T 15-17, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf.
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cesses, rather than with arbitral awards. Hence, problems concerning the enforcement of arbitral awards, that are by definition subsequent to the conclusion of
the arbitral proceedings and have already been the object of much literature, will
not be addressed. As it was noticed, "[m]uch has been written about judicial inter0
ference with arbitralaward,far less about interference with arbitrators."1
This article looks upon two fundamental questions: (1) whether arbitrators
should comply with a local court's order aimed at suspending or interrupting the
running of arbitral proceedings, and (2) what type of remedies should a party receive when courts unjustly interfere with their right to arbitrate. This article will
explore these two questions in four parts. Part II focuses on the interference with
international commercial arbitration by the court at the place of the arbitration. It
does so by taking into account ICC cases, some relevant national judgments, and
deals with the solutions offered by Articles 8 and 16 of the UNCITRAL Model
Law. Part Ill deals with the recent trend of investors bringing claims before
ICSID or NAFTA tribunals alleging that courts' interference amount to a denial of
justice and/or a violation of the Fair and Equitable Treatment standard. Part IV
draws some conclusions on the basis of the literature and jurisprudence examined.
Although rejecting the idea of arbitration as "floating in the transnational firmament, unconnected with any municipal system of law,"" it is hard to deny that in
choosing to refer their dispute to an international arbitration, the parties have consensually waived resorting to the national legal system. Therefore, if local courts
abuse their supervisory powers to the extent that they materially impede the arbitration, the original intentions of the parties (or at least of the party who has not
provoked the intervention of the courts) will be thwarted.
II. THE INTERFERENCE OF THE COURT AT THE SEAT OF THE ARBITRATION
A. The Role of the Seat ofArbitration
Two of the authors who have most significantly contributed to the analysis of
the courts' interference with international commercial arbitration state that a deep
distinction should be drawn between cases where the intrusion comes from the
court at the place of the arbitration and cases where a "foreign" or "third" court
interferes with an arbitration that is seated in a different country.' 2 In order to
understand this distinction, it is necessary to briefly consider the role of the seat in
international arbitration, a role strictly connected with the theories concerning the
source of the binding effect of international arbitration awards." Without any
pretension to giving a complete overview of a long-running philosophical and
juridical debate, it is worth recalling the two main theories that have shaped the
10. Jan Paulsson, Interference with National Courts, in THE LEADING ARBITRATOR'S GUIDE TO
119 (Lawrence H. Newman & Richard D. Hill eds., 2008).
11. Lord Justicc Kerr in Bank Mellat v. Helleniki Techniki S.A. [1984] I Q.B. 291, 301 (Eng.).
12. Paulsson, supra note 10, at 124; see generally Emmanuel Gaillard, V'interftrence des juridiclions du siege dans le diroulernent de l'arbitrage' in LIBER AMICORUM CLAUDE REYMOND: AUTOUR
DE L'ARBITRAGE; MELANGES OFFERTS A CLAUDE REYMOND, 84 (Claude Reymond ed., LexisNexis
2004).
13. FOUCHARD, GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 3 (EmmanINTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 119,

uel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999).
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role of the seat of arbitration over at least the last three decades: territorialism and
delocalization.14
According to the territorialism theory, arbitrators derive their powers from the
law of the place where they perform their duties, as do judges serving in local
courts.1 5 As a consequence, the arbitration is subject both to the law of the seat
and to the jurisdiction of the courts of that seat.' 6 The law of the seat sets both the
procedural rules, which govern the arbitral procedure in the absence of a different
agreement between the parties, and the choice of law rules, which determine the
law applicable to the merits of the dispute.17 Also, the mandatory rules to be applied by the arbitrators are those of the seat.i8 As for the powers conferred to
national courts, they have jurisdiction to review awards which were rendered in
their country.19 In addition, when an award is set aside by the court of the seat, it
ceases to exist and cannot be enforced by any other jurisdiction. 20
Delocalization theory, on the other hand, proposes that international arbitral
tribunals are detached from controls imposed by the law of the seat of arbitration.2' Under this theory, parties frequently choose to place the arbitration in a
country where the parties' business interests are located, simply because it is convenient for them. 22 Delocalization's main idea is that the sources of the arbitrators' powers derive from the international legal community.23 Therefore, the local
peculiarities of the municipal law of the place where a dispute happens to be heard
are not to be imposed on international arbitration. 24 Supporters of delocalization
argue that the arbitration procedures should be 'delocalized' and completely freed
from the mandatory rules and public policy of the place of arbitration. Accordingly, the arbitrators are not only allowed to disregard the lexfori, but may also apply
any procedural law they regard as appropriate.25 Consequently, an award set aside
from the country of the seat still can be enforced in any other jurisdiction.
An overview of the literature cited hitherto and of the cases that are analyzed
in the following paragraphs shows that international arbitration has gained a level
of relative independence from local courts. This does not mean, however, that
arbitrators shall simply disregard any undue interference from the court of the
14. For an overview of the debate on the role of the scat of the international arbitration, see JEAN
FRANCOIS POUDRET & SEBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 85

(2d ed. 2007).
15. See FOUCHARD, supra note 13.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Pierre Mayer, The Trend Towards Delocalisation in the Last 100

Years, in THE

INTERNATIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE LCIA CENTENARY CONFERENCE, 39

(Martin Hunter ed., 1996).
19. See FOUCHARD, supra note 13.
20. Id.
21. Hong Lin-Yu, Defective Awards Must be Challengedin the Courts of the Seat ofArbitration-A
Step Further Than Localisation?, 65 ARB.: THE INT'L J. OF ARB., MEDIATION & DIsP. MGMT. 196
(1999).
22. MOSES, supra note 4, at 56.
23. FOUCHARD, supra note 13.
24. Jan Paulsson, The Extent of Independence of InternationalArbitrationfrom the Law of the Situs,
in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 141, 141-42 (Julian DM Lew ed.,
1987). For more on the delocalisation theory, see Jan Paulsson, Delocalisationof InternationalCommercial Arbitration: When and Why it Matters, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 53 (1983).
25. Yu, supra note 21, at 196.
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seat. This would be impossible for at least two practical reasons. First, arbitrators
proceeding with the arbitration notwithstanding the opposition of the local courts
will end up acting in contempt of court.26 If they (or any of them) are subject to
that State's jurisdiction, because they are nationals of that State, or are domiciled
or have assets there, they may incur consequences on a personal level, as the local
courts may enforce an order opposing the prosecution of the arbitration against the
arbitrators through fines, seizure of assets or similar means.27 Additionally, an
award rendered despite opposition from local courts will be set aside by these
courts and never be enforced. This can render the arbitration proceedings useless
when the losing party's assets are located in the country of the seat, but also can
constitute a problem if the award requires enforcement in a State whose courts are
reluctant to enforce an award that has been annulled in the state of origin.
For the reasons above, interference by local courts also constitutes a dilemma
for the arbitrators who fully support the delocalization theory.
B. Issues Connected to the Arbitral Tribunal'sJurisdiction
The first and most common intervention that arbitral proceedings may experience from the court of the seat is a judgment stating that the national legal system,
rather than the arbitral panel, has jurisdiction on the case. As arbitration clauses
define arbitrators' authority and power, jurisdictional issues may rise not only
from the scope of this clause but also from its validity. When a party regrets its
agreement to submit the dispute to arbitration, it can avoid or delay arbitral proceedings by simply challenging of the scope and validity of the arbitration clause
before the local competent court.28
In order to prevent a party from hampering the effectiveness of an arbitration
clause by invoking the arbitrators' lack of jurisdiction, the arbitration law of a
number of states, supported by case law and scholars, has given full recognition to
the principle of competence-competence (or Kompetenz-Kompetenz), which refers
to the power of the arbitral tribunal to decide upon its jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the general favor attributed to this principle by national legislations and international arbitration conventions,29 its application diverges consistently in national
practices, which may vary in both the timing and in the extent of a tribunal's decision on jurisdiction. 30
Under title 9, chapter 1, section 3 of the United States Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), courts may intervene at any moment to judge the validity of the arbitration
26. Luca Radicat di Brozolo & Loretta Malintoppi, Unlawful Interference with International Arbitration by National Courts ofthe Seat in the Aftermath of Saipem v. Bangladesh in LIBER AMICORUM
BERNARDO CREMADES 993,996-97 (Miguel Angel Fernandcz-Ballcstcros & David Arias eds., 2010).
27 See Himpurna, Patuha Awards 'Defective,' Counsel for Indonesia Claims, 15 MEALEY'S INT'L
ARB. REP. 1(2000).
28. See Emmanuel Gaillard, Les Mandeuvres Dilatoires des Parties et des Arbitres dans 1Arbitrage
Commercial International, REV. ARB., 759 (1990).
29 See, e.g., UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, art. 21(1); ICC ARBITRATION RULES, art. 6(2);
LCIA ARBITRATION RULES, art. 23.1; ENGLISH ARBITRATION ACT § 1 (1996) (U.K.); GERMAN CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE [ZPO], art. 1040; BELGIAN JUDICIAL CODE, art. 1697(1); NETHERLANDS CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1052(l).

30. William W. Park, The Arbitrator's Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction, KLUWER LAW INT'L
59(2007).
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agreement without waiting until the award is rendered;31 conversely, under Article
1458 of the French Code de Proc6dure Civile (CPC), court's review of jurisdictional issues is delayed until the final award. Both of these approaches have advantages and disadvantages. Submitting the jurisdictional issues to the court at
the beginning of the arbitral proceedings certainly hinders the promptness of the
arbitration and may be considered a delaying tactic. On the other hand, making
the recourse to the court available to parties only after the award has been rendered, while avoiding an unwanted interference with the arbitration, may result in
a waste of time and money should the court find that the tribunal never had jurisdiction.
The English Arbitration Act 1996 developed a hybrid solution: under Section
32, the court may decide a preliminary point of jurisdiction only upon agreement
of all parties, or if the tribunal grants permission and the court is satisfied that its
intervention is appropriate. In the absence of these conditions, a party may challenge the tribunal's jurisdiction before a court only after the award has been rendered. In both cases, the tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings while the
application to the court is pending. The English approach seems to offer a good
compromise between the need to prevent disruption of the arbitral proceedings
and the need to save costs and avoid arbitration proceedings when the tribunal
lacks jurisdiction. However, legal practice often diverges from the original intentions of the Legislator. English case law has shown a repeated inclination of the
courts to solve the jurisdictional issues before the tribunal. In Law Debenture
Trust Corp Plc v Elektrim FinanceB V,32 Mann J. held:
In some cases it would be better for the court to act under Ord 73 r 6; in
other cases it may be appropriate to leave the matter to be decided by an
arbitrator. The latter course is likely to be adopted only where the court
considers that it is virtually certain that there is an arbitration agreement
or if there is only a dispute about the ambit or scope of the arbitration
agreement. . . . There is no support there for any suggestion that the

court should inevitably allow the arbitral tribunal to decide the jurisdiction question and stay the court proceedings in the meanwhile. 33
Unlike English courts, U.S. courts have sometimes adopted a "wait and see"
approach, 34 even if the FAA allows judicial intervention before an award is rendered. In Pacificare v. Book, 5 the plaintiffs, a group of physicians, filed a suit
31. See also Brake Masters System, Inc. v. Gabbay, 206 Ariz. 360, 363-64 (2003) ("Our arbitration
statutes and the weight of authority from other jurisdictions allow either a pre-arbitration or a postarbitration determination of arbitrability.").
32. Law Debenture Trust Corp. Plc v. Elektrim Finance BV, [2005] EWHC (Ch) 1412, [341 (Eng.),
available at http://www.nadr.co.uk/articles/published/ArbitrationLawRep/Law%20v%20Elcktrim%
202005.pdf.
33. See also Al-Naimi v. Islamic Press Agency Inc, [2000] EWCA (Civ) 17, [10] (Eng.) ("the existence of the [arbitrators'] power does not mean that a court must always refer a dispute about whether
or not an arbitration agreement exists to the tribunal whose competence to do so is itself disputed"),
available at http://www.nadr.co.uk/articles/published/ArbitrationLawR/Al-Naimi%20v%201slamic
%20Press%202000.pdf.
34. Park, supra note 30, at 28.
35. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003)
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against managed-health-care organizations, alleging the defendants unlawfully
failed to reimburse them for healthcare services they had provided to patients
covered by defendants' health plans. They brought causes of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) that allows inter alia award
of treble damages. 36 Nevertheless, the physicians had signed arbitration agreements to resolve disputes with the health care providers; some of these agreements
prevented arbitrators from awarding punitive damages.3 7 The District Court refused to compel arbitration of the RICO claims on the basis that the arbitration
clauses in the parties' agreements prohibited awards of "punitive damages," and
38
hence an arbitrator lacked authority to award treble damages under RICO. The
Supreme Court, reversing the lower court's decision, stated:
Since we do not know how the arbitrator will construe the remedial limitations, the questions whether they render the parties' agreements unenforceable and whether it is for courts or arbitrators to decide enforceability in the first instance are unusually abstract. As in Vimar, the proper
course is to compel arbitration.
In another landmark pronouncement, First Options of Chicago v. Kaplans,
the Supreme Court recognised the rights of the parties to give arbitrators the final
world on some aspects of arbitral power. 40 In this case, an award was rendered
against both an investment company (MK Investments) and its owners (Mr and
Mrs Kaplan) in relation to debts owed to a firm clearing stock trades (First Options of Chicago). 41 The Kaplans, however, who had not personally signed the
document containing the arbitration clause, denied that their disagreement with
First Options was arbitrable.4 2 The Supreme Court affirmed that the Kaplans were
not bound by the arbitration agreement but went further, suggesting "the court
should give considerable leeway to the arbitrator, setting aside his or her decision
only in certain narrow circumstances."A
A "recommendable example"" with respect to the jurisdictional issue is offered by Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Article 16 sets out a compromise between the possibility to submit to courts the question regarding the
tribunal's jurisdiction during the preliminary stages of the arbitral proceedings,
and the necessity to protect proceedings from interruptions or delays due to frivolous jurisdictional challenges. Article 16, significantly entitled "Competence of
arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction," expressly gives the arbitral tribunal the
right to rule on its own jurisdiction, both as a preliminary question and in an

36. Id. at 402.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 401.
39. Id. at 407.
40. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995). See William W. Park, The
Arbitrability Dicta in First Options v Kaplan. What Sort ofKompetenz - Kompetenz Has Crossed the
Atlantic? 12 ARB. INT'L 137 (1996) (for an analysis of the decision).
41. First Optionsof Chicago, Inc., 514 U.S. at 938.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 943.
44. Paulsson, supra note 10, at 126.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

7

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2012, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 9

224

JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2012

award on the merits.4 5 Under paragraph 3 of the same provision, "[i]f the arbitral
tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, any party may request, within thirty days after having received notice of that ruling, the court specified in article 6 to decide the matter, which decision shall be subject to no appeal;
while such a request is pending, the arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral
proceedings and make an award.", 6
Thus, the Model Law gives first word to arbitrators in relation to their jurisdiction. However, the control powers of the courts on the jurisdictional issues are
preserved, subject to two limitations: (1) the court's judgment on jurisdiction is
unappealable, preventing the parties from a long three-instance process; and (2)
the judicial review of the arbitral tribunal's preliminary decision does not interrupt
the proceedings before it.47 This approach has the advantage of allowing the parties to immediately challenge the tribunal's jurisdictional decision before the
court, with an evident savings in time and money should the tribunal incorrectly
find that it has jurisdiction. At the same time, it prevents the parties from dilatory
measures that may interrupt or delay the arbitral process, as the parties are able to
48
pursue litigation.
However, it has been noted that, because arbitrators may
choose to delay decisions on jurisdictional issues until the final award, the
UNCITRAL Model may represent less of a compromise than originally was intended by its drafters.4 9
Another possible solution may come from national judicial practices: in
many legal systems, vexatious litigants may be ordered to pay damages in addition to legal expenses.5 0 A number of U.S. decisions have employed monetary
sanctions as a tool to minimize frivolous attempts to vacate awards.5 1 In CUNA v.
Office & ProfessionalEmployees Int'l Union, the U.S. Court of Appeals stated a
company is free not to include an arbitration clause in its collective bargaining
contracts.52 However, it also stated that because the company might have "agreed
to include such a clause it will not be permitted to nullify the advantages to the
union by spinning out the arbitral process unconscionably through the filing of
meritless suits and appeals. For such conduct the law authorizes sanctions that
this court will not hesitate to impose."53 An identical policy may be followed by
future courts to discourage unjustified challenges of the arbitrators' jurisdiction.

45. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, UNCITRAL, 18th Sess.,
Annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, art. 16 (June 21, 1985), revised by Revised Articles of the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, UNCITRAL, 39th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/61/17, art. 16 (July 7, 2006), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/mlarb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf.
46 Id. 1 3.
47. Id.
48. Doug Jones, 'Competence-competence', 75 ARB.: THE INT'L J. OF ARB., MEDIATION & DISP.
MGMT. 56 (2009).
49. Park, supra note 40, at 152.
50. See, e.g, ITALIAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, art. 96 (according to which the party who willingly (or with gross negligence) brought an unmeritorious claim (or resisted a clearly meritorious one),
may also be condemned to pay to the winning party equitable damages in addition to legal expenses).
51. Park, supra note 30, at 145.
52. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y, v. Office and Prof I Employees Int'l Union, 443 F. 3d 556, 561 (7th Cir.
2006).
53. Id.
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C. Removal of an Arbitrator
The majority of national regulations on arbitration contain provisions concerning the removal of arbitrators.5 4 They reflect the need for arbitrators to adhere
to certain minimum standards of conduct, which are fundamental for the parties
and the integrity of the process. The possibility for the parties to challenge arbitrators for failing to comport with these fundamental standards is central to their
confidence in the arbitral process. 55 International arbitration practice demonstrates, however, that challenges to the appointment of an arbitrator are often motivated by delay tactics, rather than by a real concern regarding the arbitrator's
independence. 56 In order to prevent arbitration proceedings from grinding to a
halt upon the challenge of an arbitrator, international arbitral institutions usually
have the competence to judge the issue of the disqualification of an arbitrator,
such that the national courts can only be resorted to at a later stage when and if the
award is ultimately challenged.
Article 11 of the International Chamber of Commerce ('ICC') Rules permits
the parties to challenge an arbitrator, whether for an alleged lack of independence
or otherwise, through a written statement that must be submitted to the Secretariat:
either within 30 days from receipt by that party of the notification of the
appointment or confirmation of the arbitrator, or within 30 days from the
date when the party making the challenge was informed of the facts and
circumstances on which the challenge is based if such date is subsequent
57
to the receipt of such notification.
In addition, Article 7(3) of the ICC Rules stipulates that the decision of the
Court as to the challenge of the arbitrator shall be final. As it was noted, however,
this provision is merely intended to state that that decision shall not be the subject
of further recourse before the ICC Court.5 8 This means it can still be challenged
before a national court. This interpretation has been clearly adopted by the English Court of Appeal in AT&T v. Saudi Cable.59 AT&T sought to appeal against
54. See GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 594
(2011).
55. Daisy Mallett & Nathalic Allen, Party Instigated Arbitrator Challenges: A Practical Guide, 77
ARB.: THE INT'L J.OF ARB., MEDIATION AND DISP. MGMT. 59 (2011).
56. Gaillard, supra note 28, at 761. See also Karl-Heinz Bdksticgel, Practices of Various Arbitral
Tribunals, in PREVENTING DELAY AND DISRUPTION OF ARBITRATION; EFFECTIVE PROCEEDINGS IN
CONSTRUCTION CASES: INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS (ICCA CONGRESS SERIES NO. 5)

132 (Albert van Den Berg ed., 1991) (The author affirmed that there is sometimes im practice a third
motivation of a challenge, "namely the attempt to intimidate or warn either the challenged arbitrator or
the other members of the arbitral tribunal in view of eventual future decisions").
57. See also London Court of International Arbitration Rules, art. 10(4) [hereinafter LCIA Rules]
(providing that parties must submit a challenge to the LCIA Court (and the Arbitration Tribunal) either
within 15 days of the formation of the tribunal, or within 15 days of the challenging party becoming
aware of the facts or circumstances on which its challenge is based. Unless the challenged arbitrator
withdraws or all other parties agree to the challenge within 15 days of receipt of the written statement,
the LCIA Court shall decide on the challenge). A similar provision is stipulated in Articles 8 and 9 of
the American Arbitration Association ('AAA') International Rules.
58. Yves Derains & Eric A. Schwartz, A GUIDE TO THE ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION 139 (2d ed.
2005).
59. AT&T Corp. Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Saudi Cable Co., [2000] EWCA (Civ) 154 (Eng.).
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the dismissal of its application for the removal of the chairman of an arbitration
tribunal and the setting aside of three partial awards in favor of Saudi Cable.o
The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that there was no substance to the allegations of misconduct or bias.61 It was held, however, that the Court was not precluded from investigating misconduct by the finality provisions in the ICC Rules.
Lord Woolf stated
[t]uming to the express provision of the ICC rules which provides that a
decision of the ICC court should be final, I do not accept the view ...
that the finality provision means that the English courts have no power to
review the decision of the ICC court.

. .

. the English courts retain their

jurisdiction to determine whether the ICC rules have been breached when
entertaining an application to remove for alleged misconduct.62
Thus, English courts retain the last word on the challenge of an arbitrator.
On the contrary, in some national jurisdictions a decision concerning the challenge of an arbitrator cannot be annulled per se; local courts tend to postpone the
decision on the removal of the arbitrator until the award is challenged. In the
Opinter case, a party challenged an ICC decision refusing to remove an arbitrator
before a French court. 63 The Cour de Cassation declared the claim as inadmissible, as the ICC Court does not exercise a jurisdictional function." As a consequence, the Cour rejected the request of annulment, on the basis that this remedy
may apply only to the arbitral award.
U.S. courts have adopted a similar approach. Although the FAA6 6 provides
that a court may vacate an award where there was evident partiality or corruption
in the arbitrators, "it does not provide for pre-award removal of an arbitrator."6 7
In another case it has been stated that "[t]he [Federal] Arbitration Act does not
provide for judicial scrutiny of an arbitrator's qualifications to serve, other than in
a proceeding to confirm or vacate an award, which necessarily occurs after the
arbitrator has rendered his service."6 With specific reference to the decision concerning the removal of an arbitrator rendered within the frame of an institutional
arbitration, U.S. courts have held that an arbitral institution (such as the American
Arbitration Association) is immune from challenge with respect to "acts arising
out of the scope of [its] arbitral functions."69

60. Id. at [31]-[34].
61. Id. at [55].
62. Id. at [49].
63. Cour de cassation [Cass.] Civ. 2, Oct. 7, 1987, Socidtd Opinter France v. S.A.R.L. Dacomex
[1987] REV. ARB. 479.
64. Id.
65 Id.
66. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2011).
67. Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 110 F.3d 892, 895 (2d Cir. 1997).
68. Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 1984). For an extensive review of the
U.S. case law on the challenge of arbitrators, see GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS (2 ed., 2001).
69. Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1209-10 (6th Cir. 1982). See W. Michael
Tupman, Challenge and Disqualification of Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration, 38
I.C.L.Q., 26,40 (1989).
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D. Two Remarkable ICC Cases
The rules that vest the challenge of the arbitrator in the arbitral institution, at
least in the first stage, are aimed at reducing the risk of the interference of national
courts with the arbitral proceedings. However, the international practice includes
some cases where national courts have intervened despite these protections. In the
ICC Case Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Ethiopia,70 which will be more extensively
analyzed in the following paragraphs, the entire arbitral tribunal was subjected to
a challenge for bias. The claim arose out of a decision issued by the tribunal stating that the first hearing on the merits of the arbitral proceedings was to be held in
Paris, as the majority of witnesses and the participants in the hearing were based
in Europe, without prejudice to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, remaining the place of the
arbitration, as contractually agreed. 71 This decision was in compliance with a
provision of Terms of Reference that enabled the arbitrators to hold meetings and
hearings at appropriate places other than the seat of arbitration.72 Nevertheless,
the respondent submitted to the ICC Court a challenge of all the three arbitrators,
pursuant to Article 11 of the ICC Rules, alleging that the tribunal had improperly
and abusively prioritised to its own convenience and to the convenience of Salini
and its witnesses and had disregarded the convenience of the respondent and of its
witnesses. 73 After the ICC Court rejected the request of removal of the three arbitrators, the Ethiopian party initiated appellate proceedings before the Addis Ababa
Court of Appeal concerning the ICC Court's decision. 74 Pending its determination
of the appeal, the Ethiopian Court issued an injunction ordering the suspension of
the arbitral proceedings, threatening that the court would attach the property of,
and sentence for contempt of court, any person breaching the injunction.75 In the
Award rendered on December 7, 2001, which will be more extensively examined
in the following paragraph, the arbitral tribunal determined it was not bound by
the injunctions issued by the Ethiopian Courts and decided to pursue the arbitral
proceedings.
In Saipem v. Petrobangla,the interference of the local court was even more
explicit. The dispute concerned a contract for the construction of a gas pipeline in
Bangladesh entered into between Saipem S.p.A., an Italian contractor, and the
Bangladesh Oil Gas and Mineral Corporation (Petrobangla), a State entity.n The
contract was governed by the law of Bangladesh and contained an ICC arbitration

70. Salim Costruttori S.P.A. v. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa Water
and Sewerage Authority, ICC Arbitration No. 10623/AER/ACS (Dec. 7, 2001), available at
http://italaw.com/documents/Saliniv._EthiopiaAward.pdf. See Antonio Crivellaro, Note - Award of
7 December 2001 in case No. 10623, 21 ASA BULLETIN 60 (2003).
60-63.
71. Salini CostruttoriSP.A., ICC Arbitration No. 10623/AER/ACS,
72. Id. 134.
73 Id. J 68-70.
74. Id. i 75-77.
75. In the meantime, the respondent had also started a separate proceeding before the Ethiopian
Federal First Instance Court in order to challenge the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. Hence, another injunction was issued by this court "enjoining the Claimant from proceeding with the arbitration
pending its decision on the Tribunal's jurisdiction" Id. 88-89.
76. Id. T 155.
77. Saipcm S.P.A. v. The Bangladesh Oil Gas & Mineral Corp. (Petrobangla), No. 7934/CK, ASA
BULLETIN 18, 6, TT 6-7 (2000).
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clause indicating Dhaka as the seat of arbitration.7 8 During the arbitral proceedings, the tribunal denied several procedural requests submitted by Petrobangla,
which, following these adverse decisions, filed several claims before the local
courts seeking to revoke the tribunal's mandate for an alleged miscarriage of justice and to stay of the arbitration. Unlike the preceding case, where the State
party brought the challenge to the arbitrators to the ICC Court before resorting to
the national courts, Petrobangla brought such an action directly to the Dhaka
Court, in violation of Article 11 of ICC Rules. 8o A week later, the Supreme Court
of Bangladesh issued an injunction restraining Saipem from proceeding with the
ICC arbitration. 8 ' After few months, the same court issued a decision revoking
the authority of the three arbitrators for miscarriage of justice. 82 Nevertheless, the
tribunal decided to continue its proceedings "on the ground that the challenge or
replacement of the arbitrators in an ICC arbitration falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ICC Court and not of the courts of Bangladesh" and that "the
revocation of the authority of the ICC Arbitral Tribunal by the Bangladeshi courts
was contrary to the general principles governing international arbitration."8 Several other claims and injunctions followed this decision and when the arbitral panel issued a final award, it was considered as non-existent by the Supreme Court of
Bangladesh.8

E. Anti-suit Injunctions
1. The Extent of the Problem
The anti-suit injunction is probably the most powerful and effective instrument available to national courts to intervene in arbitration.8 5 Judge Stephen
Schwebel referred to the anti-suit injunction as "one of the gravest problems of
contemporary international commercial arbitration."86 The effective extent of the
use of anti-suit injunctions restraining international arbitration must be put into
perspective.
First of all, anti-suit injunctions originate from common law systems and are
rarely used, even if not completely unknown, in civil law jurisdictions.8 7 In Swit78. Id. at 7, 110.
79. Saipem S.P.A. v. The People's Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Final
Award,
1 24-25 (June 30, 2009), available at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Media
/lectures/Saipem v BangladeshICSIDAward.pdf.
80 Id 135.
81. Id. 37.
82. Id. 40.
83. Saipem v. Petrobangla, ICC Case No. 7934/CK, 18 A.S.A BULL. 2, 12 (2000); Bangladesh, No.
7934/CK at 45.
84. Bangladesh,No. 7934/CK at 50.
85. Some authors use the term "anti-arbitration injunctions" to refer to injunctions restraining the
conduct of arbitration proceedings. See, e.g., Julian D.M. Lew, Does National Court Involvement
Undermine the InternationalArbitration Process?,24 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 489, 499 (2009).
86. Stephen M. Schwebel, Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Arbitration - An Overview, in
ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 5, 5-6 (Emmanuel Gaillard ed., 2005).
87. Fernando Pombo, Arbitration and Anti Suit Injunctions in the Case Law of the European Court
of Justice, in LIBER AMICORUM BERNARDO CREMADES 975 (Miguel Angel Fernandez-Ballesteros &

David Anas eds., 2010).
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zerland, the Court of First Instance of the Canton of Geneva, in the case Air (PTY)
Ltd. v. InternationalAir TransportAss 'n, expressly considered them as contrary to
the Swiss legal system."8 In Germany, it is reported that a national court has issued an anti-suit injunction only in one case, and that was not in the context of
arbitration.89 The Italian legal system does not seem to provide for instruments
similar to those of the anti-suit injunction. 90 In France, the possibility for a court
to restrain a party from pursuing an arbitral proceedings appears to be restricted
by Article 1458 CPC, providing that "[i]f a dispute pending before an arbitral
tribunal on the basis of an arbitration agreement is brought before a State court, it
shall declare itself incompetent."9 1
Secondly, even in common law systems, where anti-suit injunctions originated and are used widely, arbitration-friendly jurisdictions, such as England, tend to
grant injunctions to restrain the arbitration proceedings only in exceptional circumstances.92 In Elektrim S.A. v. Vivendi Universal S.A., in which an injunction
was sought to restrain the respondent from pursuing arbitration before the London
Court of International Arbitration, the English Commercial Court affirmed that
under the Arbitration Act 1996 "the scope for the court to intervene by injunction
before an award is made by arbitrators is very limited." 93
Nevertheless, anti-suit injunctions remain a substantial concern in all the cases where arbitration is seated in a jurisdiction which is hostile to arbitration.
Those jurisdictions are often developing countries, where significant investments
and massive commercial transactions have been made during the last decades. 94
In these cases, it is not rare for commercial parties to be exposed to the improper
use of anti-suit injunctions, as Judge Schwebel has stated in the sentence reported
above. 95
2. Reviewing the Main Cases
Salini Costruttori S.p.A v. Ethiopia. This case has been already examined
with reference to the issue related to the challenge of the arbitrators. However, it
88. Tribunal de Premiere Instance [Court of First Instance], Case No. C/1043/2005-15SP (May 2,
2005) (Switz.), translated in 23 ASA BULL. 739, 747 (2005).
89. Alex C. Lakatos & Mark C. Hilgard, Anti-Suit Injunctions in Defence of Arbitration: Protecting
the Right to Arbitrate in Common and Civil Law Jurisdictions(PartII), 2 BLOOMBERG EUR. L.J. 41,
42 (2008), available at http://www.cbsg.com.br/pdf publicacoes/00273.pdf.

90. See Mariacarla Giorgetti, Antisuit, Cross-Border Injunction e it Processo Cautelare Italiano,
RiviSTA Di DIRITTO PROCESSUALE, 484 (2003).
91. FRENCH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE [C.P.C.], art. 1458; see also Julian D.M. Lew, Control of
Jurisdiction by Injunctions Issued by National Courts, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2006: BACK
To BASICS? 185, 196 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2007).

92. J. Jarvis & Sons Ltd. v. Blue Circle Dartford Estates Ltd., [20071 EWHC (TCC) 1262, [39]
(Eng.),
available
at
http://www.nadr.co.uk/articles/published/ArbitLRe/Jarvis%20v%
20Blue%2OCirclc%202007.pdf. In refusing an injunction, the court noted that, since Jan. 31, 1997, the
Commercial Court has apparently never granted an injunction to halt an arbitration.
93. Elektrim S.A. v Vivendi Universal S.A., [20071 EWHC (Comm) 11, [75] (Eng.), available at
http://www.nadr.co.uk/articlcs/publishcd/ArbitLRe/Eicktrim%20v%20Vivendi%202007.pdf.
94. See Peter Cornell & Arwen Handlcy, Himpurnaand Hub: InternationalArbitrationin Developing Countries, 15 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 12, 39 (2000).
95. Schwebel, supra note 86; see also Lew, supra note 91, at 186 (noticing that although the cases of
anti-arbitration injunctions remain relatively few, they "cause serious concerns for all those involved in
the arbitration").
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also contains some remarks on the effects of an anti-suit injunction issued by the
court of the place of the arbitration.
The dispute arose out of a contract concerning the construction of an emergency raw water sewerage reservoir in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 96 The first part of
the contract contained general provisions, stipulating that "unless otherwise specified in the contract," disputes had to be submitted to ICC arbitration. 97 The second part of the contract contained special conditions of application stating that
the seat of arbitration would be Addis Ababa and the Ethiopian Civil Code would
govern the arbitration. Salini, the Italian contractor, filed a claim with the ICC
Court in Paris and Ethiopia immediately objected to the tribunal's jurisdiction
claiming that the parties had agreed upon ad hoc arbitration under the Ethiopian
rules of arbitration.98 As seen above, when the ICC Court dismissed its challenge
to all three arbitrators, Ethiopia initiated proceedings concerning the ICC's decision before the Addis Ababa Court of Appeal. 99 A few days later, Ethiopia
brought separate proceedings alleging the tribunal did not hold jurisdiction over
the dispute before the Ethiopian Federal First Instance Court.100 Pending the two
proceedings, both the Ethiopian Courts issued injunctions addressed to the Italian
claimant and to the arbitral tribunal, enjoining them from proceeding with the
arbitration. o0

With the Award Regarding the Suspension of the Proceedings and Jurisdiction dated December 7, 2001, the ICC tribunal ruled that it was not bound by the
injunctions issued by the two Ethiopian Courts and that it was under a duty to
proceed with the arbitration.102 In particular, the tribunal based its decision on
three founding principles: (1) the primary source of an arbitral tribunal's authority
is the parties' agreement to arbitrate; (2) the arbitral tribunal has a duty to render
an enforceable award; and (3) a State or State entity cannot resort to the State's
courts to frustrate an arbitration agreement.' 03 While the last principle will be
analyzed in the following section, the first two statements will be examined now,
as they are crucial to understanding the tribunal's position on the effects of the
injunctions on the arbitration.
Concerning the first principle, the tribunal held that, in so far as its authority
derived from the parties' agreement to arbitrate, its primary duty was to the parties
to ensure that their agreement to arbitrate was not frustrated. Thus, the arbitrators
shall proceed with the arbitration, even where the continuation of the arbitral proceedings could create a conflict with the court of the seat of arbitration.' Taking
a clear position in the debate on the nature of the arbitration and the role of the
court of the seat, the tribunal stated, "an agreement to submit disputes to international arbitration is not anchored exclusively in the legal order of the seat of the
96. Salini Costruttori, S.P.A. v. Fcd. Republic Eth., ICC Case No. 10623/AER/ACS, Award Regarding the Suspension of Proceedings and Jurisdiction, 11 7, 10 (Dec. 7, 2001), available at
http://italaw.com/documents/Salini v. Ethiopia Award.pdf.
97. Id. I1.
98. Id. 11 13-16.
99. See infra text accompanying sub-section 0.
100. Salin CostruttoriS.P.A, ICC Arbitration No. 10623/AER/ACS, 77.
101. Id. 188.
102. Id. 1124.
103. Id. 125-76.
104. Id. 128, 138.
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arbitration. Such agreements are validated by a range of international sources and
norms extending beyond the domestic seat itself."'0o
As for the duty to issue an enforceable award, the arbitral panel recognised
that complying with the law and the decision of the seat is crucial, as the courts
have the power to set aside an award rendered in their country. 06 However, the
tribunal held that "the obligation to make every effort to render an enforceable
award does not oblige an arbitral tribunal to render awards that are fundamentally
unfair or otherwise improper. An arbitral tribunal should not go so far as to frustrate the arbitration agreement itself in the interests of ensuring enforceability."'o0
While the principles affirmed in the award are convincing and cast clear light
on the effects of a national court's injunctions over international arbitration, some
other statements should be subject to a more careful consideration. One of the
grounds for denying any effect to the Ethiopian Court of Appeal's order was that
the appeal was improperly made, as the ICC Court had rejected the respondent's
challenge of the arbitrators, and that decision should have been considered as final
under Article 11(3) of the ICC Rules.' 08 However, as seen above, this provision
has been mainly interpreted as not depriving the party of judicial recourse. If this
interpretation had been accepted, the appeal brought to the Ethiopian Court
against the ICC Court's decision would have been perfectly legitimate under Article 3342 of the Ethiopian Civil Code,109 which expressly applies to the arbitral
proceedings. 10 Although challenge of the arbitrators brought by Ethiopia sounded groundless and specious, the legitimacy of its right to appeal the ICC Court's
decision is difficult to deny.
Himpurna California Energy v. Indonesia. The case arose out of multiple
contracts by which two Bermudan corporations, owned by U.S. investors, Himpuma California Energy Ltd. (Himpurna) and Pathula Power Ltd. (PPL) agreed to
build an electrical generation plant in Indonesia and sell the electricity produced to
an Indonesian State company, PLN."1 The contract was signed and approved by
the Republic of Indonesia, which acted as guarantor for the obligations of its State
The contracts provided for arbitration in Jakarta under the
companies.
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules."12
When the dispute arose, the parties agreed to resolve it through two different
arbitrations between the two Bermudan companies, and PLN and Indonesia re-

105. Id. T 129.
106. Sahm CostruttoriS.P.A , No. 10623/AER/ACS, 1140.
107. Id 1144.
108. Id $T 158-59.
109. See Hailegabriel G. Feylssa, The Role of the Ethiopian Courts in Commercial Arbitration, 4
MIZAN L. REv. 297, 319 (2010), available at http://www.ajoi.info/index.php/mlr/article/viewFile/
63090/50958.
110. See Salini costruttori S.P.A., No. 10623/AER/ACS, T 263; see also Reza Mohtashami, In Defense of Injunctions Issued By the Courts of the Place of Arbitration: A Brief Reply to Professor
Bachand'sCommentary on Salini CostruttoriS.P.A. v. Ethiopia, 20 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 21, 47
(2005).
Ill. Himpurna Cal. Energy Ltd. v. Republic Indon., Interim Award of 26 September 1999, in
YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION VOLUME XXV - 2000 109, 109-10 (Albert Jan van den Berg

ed., 2000).
112. Id. at 114.
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spectively, such that only if PLN were held liable, the arbitration against Indonesia would proceed.' 13
In May 1999, the arbitration panel rendered an award in the arbitration
against PLN, ordering PLN to pay damages. 114 After both PLN and the Republic
of Indonesia had denied the payment, the Bermudan companies started arbitration
against Indonesia. 115 Shortly after, two different claims were brought before the
Central District Court of Jakarta by Pertamina, a State-company which was also a
party to the investment contract, seeking to annul the award against PLN and an
injunction barring further proceedings against Indonesia.' 16 The Indonesian Court
granted two injunctions, one ordering the suspension of the enforcement of the
first award, the other enjoining the Bermudan companies from proceeding with
the arbitration against Indonesia and imposing a daily fine of U.S. $ 1 million to
any party that violated this order.1 17
Nevertheless, the arbitrators, using the powers conferred to them under Article 16(2) of the UNCITRAL Rules, decided to hold the hearings in The Hague,
without prejudice of the seat of arbitration, which remained in Jakarta."' After
failing to obtain an injunction to prevent the hearing, the Republic of Indonesia
put pressure upon its appointed arbitrator, forcing him to return to Indonesia.1 1 9
However, the truncated tribunal continued its proceedings and issued an award
ordering Indonesia to pay damages to the claimants.120
Although the content of both the Interim and the Final Award rendered by the
tribunal is significant, as it strengthens the argument that the tribunal's authority
lies on the parties' agreement to arbitrate rather than the legal order of the seat of
the arbitration,1 21 the case has remained famous for the "aggressive"1 22 involvement of local courts in respect of the arbitration, culminating in the forced abandonment of the panel by the Indonesia-appointed arbitrator.

113 Id.atio.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 110, 113.
117. Himpurna Cal. Energy Ltd. v. Republic Indon., Interim Award of 26 September 1999, in
YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION VOLUME XXV - 2000 109, 110 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed.,
2000).
118. Id. at 145.
119. H. Pnyatna Abdurrasvid, They Said I Was Going to Be Kidnapped, 18 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB.
REP. 18, 29 (2003) (for an account of the kidnapping). See also Jacques Werner, When Arbitration
Becomes War: Some Reflections on the Frailty of the ArbitralProcess in Cases Involving Authoritarian States, 17 J. INT'L ARB. 97, 100 (2000).
120. Himpurna Cal. Energy Ltd. v. Republic Indon., Final Award of 16 Oct. 1999, in YEARBOOK
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION VOLUME XXV -2000 109, 214 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2000).
121. Himpurna Cal. Energy Ltd. v. Republic Indon., Interim Award of 26 Sept. 1999, in YEARBOOK
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION VOLUME XXV -2000 109, 168 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2000).
122. Mark Kantor, InternationalProject FinanceandArbitration with Public Sector Entities: When is
Arbitrabilitya Fiction?, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1122, 1125 (2001).
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F. The "Self-serving Conduct"' by a State-party
It cannot pass unnoticed that all the cases cited above involved a State or a
State-owned entity as a respondent. Although this fact alone does not establish
that States are in principle responsible for the interference of local courts in the
running of an international arbitration, it is not a coincidence. More than a private
party, a State or a public entity may be tempted to have recourse to national courts
in order to obtain a strategic advantage in arbitration taking place on its own territory.124 This is true for those constitutional systems where the division of powers
is not clearly established, as the executive power may easily succeed in pressuring
the judiciary to favor domestic economic interests of the country over those of a
foreign company.1 25 But even in jurisdictions where courts enjoy more independence, a public entity would be inclined to believe that its interests would be better
defended by a "friendly" court, rather than a neutral arbitral panel.
In any case, it would be intolerable for the development of international contractual relationships if States were to be able to frustrate arbitration agreements
by having recourse to their own courts. A similar principle has been recognised
by a well-established precedent, according to which a State cannot invoke its national law to challenge the validity of an arbitration agreement or otherwise repudiate it.12 6 If this is true for national legislation, the same principle may also apply
with respect to decisions of national courts. This consequence was drawn clearly
in Salini CostruttoriS.p.A. v. Ethiopia,where the panel held that:
[I]n effect, there is no difference between a state unilaterally repudiating
an international arbitration agreement or changing its internal law in an
attempt to free itself from such an agreement, on the one hand, and a
state going before its own courts to have the arbitral proceedings suspended or terminated [...] on the other hand. Both amount to the state reneging on its own agreement to submit disputes to international arbitration.127
Nevertheless, the tribunal was prompt in specifying that this conclusion did not
mean every application made by the State party to its own courts, where they are
at the seat of arbitration, would have been objectionable. Indeed, the courts of the
seat retained their supervisory role on arbitral proceedings. The problem would
arise only when the State entity is resorting to its own courts "in an illegitimate
123. See Jan Paulsson, Interference by National Courts, in THE LEADING ARBITRATORS GUIDE TO
143 (Lawrence W. Newman & Richard D. Hill eds., 2d ed. 2008)
(defining "self-serving conduct").
124. Emmanuel Gaillard, L'interference des Juridictionsdu Sidge dans le Diroulementde I'Arbitrage,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 119,

in LIBER AMICORUM CLAUDE REYMOND 83, 90 (2004).

125. See Werner, supra note 119.
126. Benteler v Belgium, Ad hoc Award (Nov. 18 1983), in REV. D'ARB 1989, 339 (1989); Elf
Aquitaine Iran v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., Preliminary Award of 14 January 1982, in YEARBOOK
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 104 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1986); see generally Framatome v.

Atomic Energy Organization of Iraq, ICC Case No. 3896, Award on Jurisdiction (Apr. 30, 1982); see
also Jan Paulsson, May a State Invoke its Internal Law to Repudiate Consent to International CommercialArbitration?, 2 ARB. INT'L 90, 90 (1986).
127 Salini Costruttori. S.P.A., supra note 96, 166.
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effort to renege upon the arbitration agreement."l 28 The meaning to be attributed
to the term 'illegitimate' in this context is an issue that will be addressed in the
following section.
G. Should ArbitratorsComply with the Orderof the Courts of the Seat?
In all the cited cases, the arbitral panels reacted to the interference of the local
courts by disregarding their orders and continuing with the arbitral proceedings
until the issuance of a final award. The question is whether arbitrators should
comply with the orders of the courts of the seat or, on the contrary, be entitled to
disregard such orders.
As it was held in Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Ethiopia, arbitrators have a primary duty towards the parties to ensure that their agreement to arbitrate is not
frustrated. In this sense, they should disregard the local court's order if it is aimed
to suspend or disrupt the arbitral proceedings. On the other hand, arbitrators have
a duty to render an enforceable award.12 9 Consequently, arbitrators are bound to
respect orders issued from the courts of the seat of arbitration, if they want their
award to be enforced by those courts. Moreover, an award that has been annulled
by the court of the seat will lose the privileges on enforcement offered by the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958
("New York Convention"). Under Article 5 of the New York Convention, recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, among other grounds, when
the award "has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made."o3 0 It is also worth
recalling that the arbitration is governed by the law of the place in which it is held
(lex arbitri),or at least by those rules of the lex arbitrithat are not, and cannot be,
derogated by the parties' agreement. When the parties choose to place an arbitration dispute in a particular country, that placement involves submission to the
laws of that country, including any mandatory provisions of its law on arbitration.'
Since arbitration finds its legitimacy in the parties' agreement, it is clear that
if none of the parties request arbitration to proceed after the intervention of the
courts, it must be suspended or terminated.132 However, as the cases mentioned so
far demonstrate, in practice arbitrators face cases where one party resorts to the
courts in order to enjoin the proceedings while the other party insists they continue. In order to address these issues, they must adopt a clear and fair standard to
128. Id. 176.
129. See International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules of Arbitration, effective Jan. 1, 2012, art.
41, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4199/index.html ("In all matters not expressly provided for in these Rules, the Court and the Arbitral Tribunal shall act in the spirit of these
Rules and shall make every effort to make sure that the Award is enforceable at law").
130. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, article 5 ("1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that: . . . (c) The award has not
yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the
country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made").
131. BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 1,at 184.
132. Radicati di Brozolo & Malintoppi, supra note 26, at 1000.
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determine whether to continue with arbitration or to renounce their powers and
refer the dispute to the local jurisdiction.
The easiest solution would be that arbitrators should not comply with an order
issued by a national court if it is illegitimate. This solution raises more questions
than it answers, as it does not explain under which law the intervention of national
courts should be considered as illegitimate.1 33 In the absence of any reference, the
term recalls the same impalpable difference between intervention and interference,
referred to in Part I. It is worth noticing that almost every order issued by a national court would be perfectly legitimate under its national law.
Some scholars refer to the "accepted practice of international arbitration" and
134
the "accepted international law rules applicable to international arbitration,,
with specific reference to the principles of competence-competence, separability,
and the doctrine that the legality of the arbitral process may only be controlled
after an award is made.' 3 5 This solution is attractive but raises two main problems: first, the renvoi to the principles of international arbitration law would not
satisfy the need for more certainty; secondly, the principles in question are
grounded in arbitral case law and national laws, but they are not universally accepted. It is even harder to claim that these principles are part of "international
law as it applies to international arbitration."13 6 On the contrary, a review of the
relevant case law indicates that they are not shared by those arbitration-unfriendly
jurisdictions whose courts are more likely to intervene to hinder the smooth running of arbitral proceedings. It is also very difficult to say that national courts are
bound by these principles, unless they are not part of national arbitration law.
As seen in the previous paragraph, the Salini award seems to state that arbitrators should decline to comply with an order issued by the court of the seat if it
is inconsistent with the parties' agreement.' 3 7 This is a reasonable solution, but
should be better clarified. When is an order inconsistent with the parties' agreement? First of all, when it is contrary to the provisions of the arbitration clause or
violates the rules governing the selected arbitration procedure. In Saipem v.
Petrobangla, the proceedings brought by Petrobangla before the Bangladeshi
Courts concerning the alleged the arbitrators' misconduct were in open violation
of the ICC Rules, applicable pursuant to the arbitration clause, which provide that
a challenge to the arbitrators must be submitted to the ICC Court. In this sense,
the orders issued by the Supreme Court of Bangladesh restraining Saipem from
proceeding with the arbitration and revoking the authority of the arbitral tribunal
were inconsistent with the arbitration agreement and with the (original) intention
of the parties. In fact, the choice of the ICC arbitration excludes, at least in the
first instance, any possibility for the domestic courts to rule on the removal of the
133. See Luca Radicati di Brozolo, Interference by National Courts with InternationalArbitration:
the Situation After Saipem v. Bangladesh, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 2009 1, 11 (Christoph Miller & Antonio Rigozzi, eds., 2009).
134. Lew, supranote 91, at 214.
135. Id See also Gaillard,supra note 124, at 91.
136. Lew, supranote 134, at 217.
137. Salim Costruttori S.P.A. v. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa Water
128 (Dec. 7, 2001), available at
and Sewerage Authority, ICC Arbitration No. 10623/AER/ACS,
http://italaw.com/documents/Salini v. Ethiopia Award.pdf; see also Frederic Bachand, Must An ICC
Tribunal Comply With An Anti-Suit Injunction Issued By The Courts Of The Seat Of The Arbitration?,
20 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 16, (2005) (commenting on Salim Costruttori S.P.A. v. Ethiopia).
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arbitrators. Identical considerations should be made with respect to injunctions
issued by the Indonesian Courts in contradiction with the UNCITRAL Rules as in
Himpurna v. Indonesia.
The guiding principle of the parties' intentions and expectations may be appropriate even when the seat of arbitration's procedural rules apply. This may
happen in cases where the national court's order is consistent with the arbitration
clause or the arbitral procedure, or in cases where the arbitration clause is silent
with respect to the procedural rules to be applied. In the Salini case, the tribunal
censured the State party for its "illegitimate effort to renege upon the arbitration
agreement." 13 8 Broadening this statement, it can be affirmed that a domestic
court's order is inconsistent with the parties' agreement when it is grounded only
on the abusive intent of one of the parties to frustrate the agreement through the
suspension or the halt of the arbitration. In Salini CostruttoriS.p.A. v. Ethiopia, if
we rely on the interpretation of the ICC Rules that does not impede the recourse to
national courts after having unsuccessfully challenged the arbitrators before the
ICC Court, the action concerning the alleged arbitrators' misconduct brought by
the respondent before the Ethiopian Courts was not inconsistent with the arbitration clause. Nevertheless, as the challenge was brought regarding the arbitrators'
conduct-which was fully in compliance with the ICC Rules-it can be stated that
the only ground on which the claim relied upon was the intention of Ethiopia to
impede the arbitral proceedings. It is a standard not far from that of the "prima
facie groundless" claim that exists in many domestic jurisdictions and from the
doctrine of the abuse of right, which has been widely recognized as a principal of
international law. 3 9
It may be argued that the proposed criterion is still too vague and leaves
broad discretion to arbitrators on whether they should comply with the domestic
courts' orders and stay arbitration proceedings or disregard them and continue
with the arbitration until the final award is rendered. As vague as it may be, this
approach provides arbitrators with flexibility, which is necessary when legal and
practical problems are at issue. For example, if the respondent's assets are located
predominantly in the country of the seat, the arbitrators should be very careful in
ignoring the local courts' decisions, when this would threaten the enforcement of
the award.
On the other hand, the proposed criterion is strict in requiring the tribunal to
disregard domestic courts' orders only when they are patently groundless and
based on the mere intention to hinder the arbitral proceedings. This means these
orders should normally be considered as an expression of the supervisory powers
of the court of the seat and, therefore, directly applicable to the tribunal. 1 40 This

138. Salini CostruttoriS.P.A, ICC Arbitration No. 10623/AER/ACS, 176.
139. See Saipem S.P.A. v. The People's Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Final
Award, 1 160 (June 30, 2009), available at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Media/lectures/Saipem
v BangladeshICSIDAward.pdf. It is worth recalling that according to the abuse of right doctrine,
the exercise of a right for a purpose that is different from that for which the power was given constitutes an abuse of that right.
140. In this sense, the solution proposed seems able to provide an answer to the concerns of those
scholars who give the greater importance to the lex arbitrii of the seat. See JEAN-FRAN(OUIS
POUDRET & SEBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 117 (Stephen
V. Berti & Annette Ponti trans., 2d ed. 2007) (affirming that the arbitrators should obey the decisions
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rule also seems to reflect the mutual relationship between the court of the seat and
the arbitration agreement: by choosing to refer their dispute to arbitration with its
seat in a certain country, the parties expressly agreed to be bound by the decisions
of the court of the seat and subject to their supervisory powers. As a consequence,
these decisions are binding and these powers shall be complied with only if they
do not frustrate the arbitration agreement, which is the ground that justifies the
exercise of courts' powers upon the parties.
III. A POSSIBLE REMEDY TO THE COURT'S INTERFERENCE
A. The Courts' Misconduct is a Denial ofJustice
The previous Part focused on the undue interference of the court of the seat
on international arbitration and offered a possible solution for the question of
whether arbitrators should comply with a court's order. This Part considers the
possible scenarios that may occur after a court's intervention has taken place and
the solutions parties may resort to after the arbitration has been disrupted by a
domestic court.
One possible solution can be found in the doctrine that the wrongful conduct
of the national courts is a ground for state responsibility under investment treaties.
That the misconduct of domestic courts may lead to an international wrong by the
State is not a new development in international law and this principle has already
been affirmed by the French-Italian Conciliation Commission in decision No. 136
of 25 June 1952 concerning a dispute over Italian properties in Tunisia, where it
was held that: "La sentence rendue par I'autoritejudiciaire est une dmanation
d'un organe de I'Etat [...] La non-observance d'une rkgle internationale,de la
part d'un tribunal, crie la responsabilit6 internationalede la collectivitd dont le
tribunalest un organe."14 1 This principle was codified in Article 4 of International Law Commission's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, which states that: "The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises
42
legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions."
The failure of a national legal system to provide due process to aliens is traditionally subsumed under the concept of denial of justice, which represents a fundamental part of customary international law on the treatment of aliens, usually
embodied in the notion of Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET). The concept of
denial of justice embraces not only the refusal of access to justice, but also cases
where investors resorting to domestic litigation in the host state face proceedings

issued by the courts at the seat, unless they are manifestly abusive. This argument appears to suggest
that when those decision are abusive, the courts themselves violate the law of the seat).
141. U.N. Reports of Int'l Arb Awards [Recucil Des Sentences Arbitrales], French/Italian Conciliation Commission XIII, 438 (Dec. 7, 1955) (interpretation of article 79 of the 1947 Peace Treaty).
142. Text adopted by the Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and submitted to the General
Assembly: Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR INT'L L. COMM'N
53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (2001).
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marred by undue delay, illegitimate assertion of jurisdiction, discrimination, corruption or gross incompetence.143
Traditionally, denial ofjustice was a ground to invoke the State's responsibility under the aegis of diplomatic protection. However, with the recent expansion
of bilateral investment treaties (BIT) and regional trade agreements, such as the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) allowing direct access to arbitration, investors who have fallen victim to a violation of their right of access to
justice have started to bring their claims before international arbitration tribunals.
In the last decade there have been a number of claims raised by foreign investors whose rights have allegedly been violated by the domestic courts of the State
where the investment was made.'" The various situations in which international
liability may arise as a consequence of the actions of domestic courts were analyzed in detail in Azinian v. Mexico.145 In that case the NAFTA tribunal held that
a denial of justice that breaches NAFTA's guarantees of fair and equitable treatment arises when a municipal court's decision is "clearly incompatible with a rule
of international law," or when the relevant courts "refuse to entertain a suit," "subject it to undue delay" or "administer justice in a seriously inadequate way." 46
In a second claim under NAFTA Chapter 11, a Canadian company brought an
action against the City of Boston for breach of contract to sell property within a
redevelopment plan.14 7 While the Massachusetts First Instance Court found in
favour of the Canadian claimant, the decision was reversed by the Supreme Judicial Court and then by the U.S. Supreme Court. The investor initiated arbitration
proceedings against the United States for breach of NAFTA Chapter 11 obligations, alleging that the Massachusetts state court rulings constituted an expropriation of the investment.148 In dismissing the claim, the tribunal tried to set an applicable standard for denial of justice, holding that "[t]he test is not whether a
particular result is surprising, but whether the shock or surprise occasioned to an
impartial tribunal leads, on reflection, to justified concerns as to the judicial propriety of the outcome" and that the decision of the domestic courts should be
"clearly improper and discreditable." 49
In Waste Management v. Mexico, the NAFTA tribunal referred to the above
mentioned case law to specify the content of the minimum standard of FET, holding that the latter "is infringed by conduct attributable to the State and harmful to
the claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, . . .
or involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial
143. All these categories are analysed by JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005), which represents the most recent and complete modem treatise on denial ofjustice.
144. See Alexis Mourre & Alexandre Vagenheim, Some Comments on DenialofJustice in Public and
PrivateInternationalLaw After Loewen and Saipem, in LIBER AMICORUM BERNARDO CREMADES 843,
848 (Femindez Ballesteros & David Arias eds., 2010).
145. See Robert Azinian v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, First Application of ICSID Additional Facility Rules, IN 99-103 (Nov. 1, 1999), 14 ICSID Rev. - F.I.L.J 538
(1999), reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 537 (2000), available at http:/icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontScrvlct?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC544_En&cascld=Cl56.
146. Id.1 102.
147. Mondev Int'l, Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Final Award
(Oct. 11, 2002), 42 1.L.M 85 (2003), available at http://www.statc.gov/documcnts
/organization/14442.pdf.
148. Id.12.
149. Id. T 127.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2012/iss1/9

22

Carbone: Carbone: Interference of the Court

No. 1]

The Interference of the Court of the Seat

239

propriety."Iso In this case, the claim of denial of justice was grounded, among
others, on the attempt of the City of Acapulco to frustrate an arbitration agreement
entered into with the claimant by commencing proceedings before Mexican
courts. The NAFTA tribunal rejected the claim only because "it may be inferred
from the decisions both of the federal and State courts that they would have enforced the arbitration clause against the City." 151 It can be gleaned from the
wording of the award that if the Mexican courts had upheld the groundless objection raised by the City, Mexico would have been accountable for a violation of
international law.
In all the three cases mentioned, the NAFTA tribunals attempted to set a reasonable and acceptable standard of denial of justice, but denied that a violation of
that standard was committed by the respondent State. Even in the well-known
Loewen case, where the occurrence of a denial of justice was patent, the investment tribunal dismissed the investor's claim, on the basis of the failure to satisfy
the rules on the continuous nationality and on the exhaustion of domestic remedies.152 The experience of NAFTA case-law demonstrates the reluctance of international judges to recognize that a denial of justice has been perpetrated by the
host State.
However, in recent years, investment tribunals seem to have abandoned their
initial reticence to effectively protecting investors against the abuse of jurisdictional powers perpetrated by the host State. In Chevron-Texaco v. Ecuador,153 the
U.S. claimant filed seven breach-of-contract cases against the Government before
the Ecuadorian courts, but all the judges failed to rule for thirteen years in any of
these cases. The UNCITRAL tribunal addressed the claim as a breach of the provision of the U.S.-Ecuador BIT concerning effective means of asserting claims
and enforcing rights, rather than a case of denial of justice.154 The BIT provision
was considered lex specialis with respect to the prohibition of denial of justice,
requiring a less-demanding test, even if the two concepts substantially overlapped.
This way, the tribunal discharged the claimant from meeting the high threshold
requested for denial of justice.

150. Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Final
at
available
(2004),
967
1.L.M.
43
1 98 (Apr. 30, 2004),
Award,
http://www.naftalaw.org/disputes_mexico-waste.htm.
151. Id. 1123.
152. The Loewcn Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, Case No.
ARB(AF)/98/3, Final Award (June 26, 2003), 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003), available at
http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Locwcn/LocwenFinalAward.pdf. The award was subject to stem
criticism: see, e.g., Noah Rubins, Loewen v. United States, the Burial of an Investor-State Investment
Claim, 21 ARB. INT'L 1 (2005); Francesco Francioni, Access To Justice, Denial OfJustice And International Investment Law, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 729 (2009); JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 182-94 (2005).

153. Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador, Perm. Ct. Arb. Case No.
available at
(Mar.
30,
2010),
the
Merits
Award
on
2009-23,
Partial
http://italaw.com/documents/ChevronTexacoEcuadorPartialAward.PDF.
154. Id. 1 241-43.
155. Id. 244.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

23

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2012, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 9

240

JOURNAL OFDISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2012

B. Does the Domestic Courts'InterferenceConstitute a DenialofJustice?
In all the mentioned cases, the State's alleged responsibility came from the
impossibility for the investor to find adequate redress before the local courts. The
issue to be discussed in this section is whether an investor may hold the State
responsible for its undue disruption of the arbitration proceedings caused by a
national court. The idea that the refusal of a State to arbitrate pursuant to an arbitration clause in a contract between that State and an alien constitutes a denial of
justice was first formulated by Judge Schwebel with these words:
The right of an alien to arbitration of disputes arising under a contract is a
valuable right, at times so valuable that the alien will contract only on
condition of contractual assurance of that right . . .. If the alien's right to

arbitration is negated by the contracting State, a wrong under international law ensues. 5 6
Would it make any difference under international law if the negation of the
alien's right to arbitration by the contracting State were grounded on the undue
interference of local courts rather than on the refusal of the Government to arbitrate? From a general point of view, the answer should be negative, as an international wrong may be committed by a State through any of its organs, no matter
whether governmental or judiciary. As Judge Schwebel in a more recent contribution affirmed, "when a domestic court, an organ of the State in the eyes of international law, blocks access to arbitration through issuance of an anti-suit injunction,
that too constitutes a denial of justice for which the State of which the court is part
57
... is internationally responsible."

However, an international tribunal has never decided this issue. The first and
only attempt to affirm the State's responsibility for denial of justice caused by
local courts' undue disruption of an arbitration was Saipem v. People's Republic
ofBangladesh. This ICSID case is the second episode of a legal saga starting with
the ICC case, Saipem v. Petrobangla,already mentioned in Part 111.15s After the
Supreme Court of Bangladesh considered the ICC award as non-existent, Saipem
filed a claim before ICSID under the Italy-Bangladesh BIT. However, this BIT
provided for compensation in case of expropriation only and, in addition, Saipem
had not attempted to exhaust legal remedies theoretically available in Bangladesh.
This is why the claim was pleaded as an expropriation and not as a denial of justice.59 Saipem argued that misconduct of the Bangladeshi courts expropriated
60
Saipem's right to have the dispute settled by arbitration.1
The case was argued and decided by using the conceptual framework and the
authorities concerning the denial of justice. The ICSID tribunal held that in revoking the ICC arbitrators' authority, "the Bangladeshi courts exercised their
66 (1987).
157. Schwebel, supra note 86, at 13.
158. Saipem v. Petrobangla, ICC Casc No. 7934/CK, 18 A.S.A BULL. 2, 12 (2000)..
159. Saipem S.P.A. v. The People's Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Final
Award, IM 129-34 (June 30, 2009), available at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Media/lectures
/Saipem v BangladeshICSIDAward.pdf.
160. Id.
156. STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION THREE SALIENT PROBLEMS
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supervisory jurisdiction for an end which was different from that for which it was
instituted and thus violated the internationally accepted principle of prohibition of
abuse of rights."' 61 This expression clearly recalled the principles of denial of
justice, even without mentioning them. As the case was pleaded as an expropriation, the tribunal held that the rule of exhaustion of local remedies did not apply.162 However, in obiter the tribunal affirmed that if that requirement applied,
Saipem would be deemed to have satisfied it, as recourse to other courts in Bangladesh would have been futile.' 63 Indeed, it seems that if the BIT had contained a
FET clause, this case would have been the first one in which compensation for
denial of justice would have been awarded to an investor.
The tribunal's qualification of the local courts' conduct as an expropriation
rather than a denial of justice raised some doubts among scholars.'6 However,
the Saipem case opens the road to redress for investors whose right to settle the
dispute by arbitration has been frustrated by the interference of the domestic
courts. Although in every case mentioned, the tribunal was very cautious in explaining that investment tribunals are not courts of appeal, as a practical matter,
every arbitral panel was ready to review the national court's decision on the merits.
Obviously, not all situations where arbitration proceedings have been disrupted by the intervention of the local courts may be the subject of a claim before
investment tribunals. At least the following prerequisites should exist:
i) the dispute should arise directly out from an investment;
ii) there must be an applicable treaty (a BIT or a multilateral treaty) between the State whose investor is a national and the State where the investment has been made;
iii) the treaty should provide for compensation in case of denial of justice
or more generally a violation of FET;
iv) the interference must come from the courts of the host State;
v) the investor must have exhausted the local remedies provided by the
host State.
As Saipem demonstrated, in the absence of the requirement under (iii), the claim
may be successfully pleaded as an expropriation of the right to arbitrate. It may
be argued, however, that even in this event, the rule of the exhaustion of local
remedies should apply, as it seems relevant every time an international wrong
rises from a miscarriage of justice. Since the ratio underlying this principle resides in the need to resort to the remedies provided by a legal system, before affirming the failure of the entire system, it seems clear that this ratio is common to
161. Id. 91.
162. Id. 181.
163. Id. 182-84..
164. Mourre & Vagenhim, supra notc 144, at 864-66; see also Mavluda Sattorova, JudicialExpropriation or Denial of Justice? A Note on Saipern v Bangladesh, 13 INT'L ARB. L. REV. 35 (2010).
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any form of court's misconduct, should it be considered a denial of justice or an
expropriation. On the other hand, Saipem showed a more flexible approach in
discerning the situations where the attempt to resort to local remedies is futile,
through the application of a standard of "reasonable" measures which is lower that
the one imposed in the Loewen case and is meant to reconcile the need to give the
system a "possibility of redemption" and the protection of the investor.
The Saipem decision has proved to be controversial and its solutions have not
always been shared.1 65 In GEA v Ukraine, a German investor started ICSID proceedings against Ukraine after having unsuccessfully tried to enforce an ICC
award in the Ukrainian domestic courts. The arbitral tribunal determined that "the
fact that the Award rules upon rights and obligations arising out of an investment
does not equate the Award with the investment itself'. 166 However, the statement
that an award "in and of itself' does not constitute an investment does not appear
to be in contrast with the findings of the Saipem Tribunal, which held that "the
rights embodied in the ICC Award were not created by the Award, but arise out of
the Contract." Thus, the Saipem Tribunal did not find necessary to state whether
the Award itself qualifies as an investment, since the contract rights constituted an
investment within the BIT.167 A halfway approach was adopted in FrontierPetroleum Services Ltd v. Czech Republic, where the tribunal-determined that, by refusing to recognize and enforce the Final Award in its entirety, the Respondent
"could be said to have affected the management, use, enjoyment, or disposal by
Claimant of what remained of its original investment."' 68
The GEA and FrontierGroup awards prove the uneasiness of the arbitral tribunals to establish that a domestic court's failure to enforce an award constitutes
an expropriation. However, "this is not to say that treaty tribunals will or should
desist from reviewing the conduct of national courts."1 69 In fact, the interference
of a State with international arbitration through the action of the local courts can
still be evaluated against the threshold of the principle of denial ofjustice.

IV. CONCLUSION
Generalizing a statement from Judge Schwebel, the phenomenon of the intrusion of local courts into international arbitration proceedings "has generated too
little consideration, still less confrontation, and still less cure."'170 The extent of
this interference depends upon the national attitude towards international arbitra165. Promod Nair, State Responsibilityfor Non-Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Revisiting Saipem
Two Years On, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Aug. 25, 2011), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.comlblog/
2011/08/25/state-responsibility-for-non-enforcement-of-arbitral-awards-revisiting-saipem-two-yearson.
166. GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award, 162 (Mar. 31,
2011), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/GEA-vUkraincAward_3 1Mar201 I.pdf.
167. Saipem v. The People's Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures, 11 127-28 (Mar. 21, 2007), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontScrvlet?requestTypc=CascsRH&actionVal=showDoc&docldDC529 En&caseld=C52.
168 Frontier Petroleum Scrvs. Ltd v. Czech Republic, Perm. Ct. Arb., Final Award, 231 (Nov. 12,
2010), availableat http://www.italaw.com/documents/FrontlerPetroleumv.CzechRepublicAward.pdf
169. Nair, supra note 165.
170. Schwcbcl, supra note 86, at 5.
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tion, which may range between an arbitration-friendly attitude and a suspicion
towards alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Nevertheless, it is a phenomenon that has gained a new momentum in the last decade. As it has been noted,
"the interference by sovereign entities is on the rise.""'
As mentioned in Part 1, this article looks upon two fundamental questions:
(1) whether the arbitrators should comply with a local court's order aimed at suspending or interrupting the running of arbitral proceedings, and (2) what type of
remedies should a party receive when courts unjustly interfere with their right to
arbitrate. Neither of these questions has a straightforward answer because they
rely both on juridical factors, such as the adopted theory on the nature of the arbitration and the interpretation of the parties' original intent, and on the specific
factual circumstances of the case.
Concerning the first question, the solution proposed is grounded on the original intention of the parties, considered as the primary source of the arbitrators'
authority. This does not imply that arbitrators can disregard every decision issued
by local courts, nor that arbitration shall exist in a legal vacuum, floating above
domestic legal systems. On the contrary, this solution lies on the simple consideration that the parties have originally decided to resort to arbitration because they
wanted to avoid submitting their dispute to domestic jurisdiction. As a consequence, the intervention of local courts is justifiable only if it is not in violation of
the arbitration agreement. Since a national court is not bound by the rules set by
parties or arbitral institutions,'2 it is not the validity of the court's decisions that
must be assessed at this point, but the opportunity for the arbitrators to comply
with those decisions.
As outlined before, according to the solution proposed, the arbitrators may
ignore the local court's order when it is inconsistent with the provisions of the
arbitration clause or violates the rules governing the selected arbitration procedure, since the arbitrators' primary duty towards the parties mandates this approach. On the contrary, this cannot apply when the national court's order is consistent with the arbitration clause or the arbitral procedure or it is in compliance
with the local procedural rules applicable to the arbitral proceedings. In these
cases, it seems that the arbitrators could reasonably disregard the said order only
when it is grounded on the abusive intent of one of the parties to frustrate this
agreement through the suspension or the disruption of the arbitration. It is worth
noting that the court's decision may be regarded as illegitimate under international
law, and giving rise to a denial of justice, under this latter case. It also seems fair
to recognize that while the latter standard has been accepted even by the scholars
who pay the utmost respect to the courts of the seat of arbitration, 73 the former
would probably be firmly opposed. This is what the arbitrators could do. Turning
to the second question, Saipem is a landmark decision since it gives new hope to
investors, holding that States could be considered liable under international law
for the wrongful conduct of their courts hindering the arbitral proceedings.
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In a certain sense, the threshold adopted by investment tribunals in assessing
the commission of a denial of justice is consistent with the second standard proposed above to guide the arbitrators' decisions whether to comply with or disregard the order of courts interfering in the arbitration, as they both borrow some
ideas from the doctrine of the abuse of right. It is true that the threshold related to
denial of justice is stricter than the standard proposed, as the relevant jurisprudence held that the decision of the local court must be "arbitrary, grossly unfair,
unjust or idiosyncratic," 74 offending "judicial propriety."' However, this difference may be mainly attributed to the higher level of gravity that conduct should
show to be considered an international wrong rather than a mere standard for assessing the opportunity of a decision.
Apart from the proposed solution, the interference by national courts is often
an effect of a wrong choice of the seat of arbitration. Being perfectly aware that
in practice lawyers' concerns may give way due to the lack of bargaining power of
their clients, nonetheless it seems useful to mention some simple contractual precautions that aim at minimizing the risk of disruption of the arbitral proceedings.
The straightforward suggestion would be to avoid seating arbitration in a country
that is not arbitration-friendly or has not ratified the New York Convention. Two
additional suggestions may be drawn from the Himpurna case. First, the arbitration clause should provide that none of the arbitrators be a national or a resident or
have assets in the country of the seat.176 It would also be safer if none of the arbitrators had the same nationality as the parties. Secondly, the arbitration clause
should give the arbitrators the power to hold hearings in a place different from the
seat of the arbitration. The interference of the local courts is a phenomenon that
pertains to the pathological aspect of the relationship between national jurisdictions and international arbitration and, as a consequence, it is difficult to prevent.
Nevertheless, a wisely constructed clause may give the arbitration a shelter from
any inappropriate interference.
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176. This may be a drastic measure, as it means that it would not be possible to appoint an English
arbitrator if the scat of arbitration is London. Obviously, this suggestion applies when the arbitration is
seated in a country that has a hostile approach towards arbitration.
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